Methods of protecting decentralized autonomous organizations from crashes and attacks

Methods of protecting decentralized autonomous organizations from crashes and attacks

Автор: Andryukhin A.A.

Журнал: Труды Института системного программирования РАН @trudy-isp-ran

Статья в выпуске: 3 т.30, 2018 года.

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Field of study: Blockchain technology, decentralized autonomous organizations, smart contract and their resistance to attacks and failures. Theoretical and practical significance: Due to the fact that such a form of organization is experimental, participants often face problems of attacks on the organization, the consequences of incorrectly written rules and of fraud. The task of creating decentralized autonomous organizations that are resistant to failures and attacks, and research on the causes of such problems has become relevant for software developers and architects. Goals and objectives of work: Investigation of attack algorithms and development of methods for ensuring the sustainability of decentralized autonomous organizations for attacks on the basis of analysis of the subprocesses of border events and logs using the methods of Process Mining. The methods to be developed should promptly identify and prevent inconsistencies between the alleged and actual behavior of smart contracts that lead to such errors in the operation, such as the content of spam contracts, empty transactions, increased block processing time, etc.

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Blockchain, decentralized autonomous organizations, process mining, smart contract, security

Короткий адрес: https://sciup.org/14916535

IDR: 14916535   |   DOI: 10.15514/ISPRAS-2018-30(3)-11

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