On the possibility of a rational concept of absolute non-being

The subject of research is the problem of non-existence, or rather absolute nothingness. This is one of the central ontological problems as it is, in essence, one of the formulations of the first principle problem. This paper directly addresses the problem of nothingness from the perspective of the approach that identifies itself as a «philosophy of nothingness». According to this approach, substance is claimed to be absolute nothingness, which gives rise to existence. Currently, there can be distinguished three varieties in the «philosophy of nothingness»: rationalistic (dialectical), irrational (metaphysical), and radical (absolute, total). The immediate objective of this study is to analyze the possibility of identifying absolute nothingness by rational means. This possibility is declared by a rationalist version of the «philosophy of nothingness». The problem is considered in the paper from the point of view of dialectical methodology, which is also used in rationalist «philosophy of nothingness». The study shows the difficulty of substantialization of nothingness. The author provides arguments for the impossibility of a consistent rational concept of absolute nothingness. It is concluded that the problem of the relationship between existence and non-existence can be rationally solved only through consistent dialectical methodology. This methodology denies substantialist obscurity and implies a substantialist dialectical relationship between being and nothingness as the essential characteristics of the first principle. A positive value of the «philosophy of nothingness» is that draws attention to the ontological study of the first principle, makes it possible to look beyond the traditional understanding of this problem. The study results can be helpful in the search for a universally accepted ontological definition of matter.